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Intestate Inheritance Rights for
Unmarried Committed Partners:
Lessons for U.S. Law Reform from the
Scottish Experience
E. Gary Spitko *
ABSTRACT: No U.S. state affords intestate inheritance rights to the
unmarried and unregistered committed partner of a decedent. This omission
has become more and more problematic in recent years as cohabitation rates
in the United States have risen and marriage rates have declined. Indeed, the
phenomenon of increasing cohabitation rates and declining marriage rates is
observed across the developed world. Unlike in the United States, however, a
significant number of foreign jurisdictions have reformed their law to afford
intestate inheritance rights to a decedent’s surviving unmarried committed
partner.
This Article looks to Scottish law to inform consideration of how U.S. states
might best reform their intestacy statutes so as to provide intestate inheritance
rights to a surviving unmarried committed partner. Examination of Scottish
law should prove especially fruitful for U.S. law reformers. The relevant
Scottish statutory provisions have been in effect since 2006 and have been
extensively critiqued by Scottish courts, academics, and practitioners. Indeed,
the Scottish Law Commission (“SLC”), whose recommendations led to
adoption of the current scheme, has called for repeal of these intestacy
provisions, and has offered a replacement scheme. Moreover, Scottish
succession law and U.S. succession law share significant norms valuing
certainty and preferring fixed entitlements and limited judicial discretion.
The Article evaluates the Scottish statute with respect to three major issues of
principle that should be at the center of U.S. reform discussions: fulfillment
of purpose, implications for certainty and administrative convenience, and
implications for marriage. The Article similarly evaluates the SLC’s proposal
*
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to replace the current statute. Finally, the Article reflects upon the Scottish
statute and SLC proposal in considering which elements of Scottish law a
U.S. state might profitably borrow or should reject in an effort to craft a more
inclusive approach to the intestate inheritance rights of U.S. unmarried
committed partners consistent with the principles of U.S. succession law. The
jumping off point for this discussion is this author’s previously published
proposal for a model statute that implements an accrual/multi-factor
approach to intestate inheritance rights for unmarried committed partners.
After describing the significant features of this proposal, the Article considers
how one might evolve the proposed accrual/multi-factor approach to
incorporate the lessons learned from the Scottish experience.
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BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

No U.S. state affords intestate inheritance rights to the unmarried and
unregistered committed partner of a decedent. 1 In recent years, this omission
has become increasingly problematic as cohabitation rates in the United
States have risen and marriage rates have declined. 2 Indeed, the
phenomenon of increasing cohabitation rates and declining marriage rates is
observed across the developed world. 3 Unlike in the United States, however,
a significant number of foreign jurisdictions have reformed their law to afford
intestate inheritance rights to a decedent’s surviving unmarried committed
partner. 4
This Article looks to Scottish law to inform how U.S. states might best
provide intestate inheritance rights to surviving unmarried committed
partners. Examination of Scottish law should prove especially fruitful for U.S.
law reformers. The relevant Scottish statutory provisions have been in effect
since 2006 and have been extensively critiqued by Scottish courts, academics,
and practitioners. Indeed, the Scottish Law Commission (“SLC”), 5 whose
recommendations led to adoption of the current scheme, has called for a
repeal of these intestacy provisions and has offered a replacement scheme. 6
Also, Scottish succession law and U.S. succession law share significant norms,

1. New Hampshire comes close in providing intestacy rights for unmarried “[p]ersons
cohabiting and acknowledging each other as husband and wife, and generally reputed to be such,
for the period of 3 years, and until the decease of one of them.” N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 457:39 (2016). See generally In re Estate of Bourassa, 949 A.2d 704 (N.H. 2008) (holding that a
couple was not common law married and therefore the surviving partner was not entitled to
intestacy inheritance rights).
2. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marriage Is on the Decline and Cohabitation Is on the Rise: At
What Point, if Ever, Should Unmarried Partners Acquire Marital Rights?, 50 F AM. L.Q. 215, 216–22
(2016) (documenting declining marriage rates and rising cohabitation rates in the United States,
especially between 2000 and 2010).
3. See Family Law (Scotland) Bill 2005, SP Bill [36], Policy Memorandum ¶ 57,
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S2_Bills/Family%20Law%20(Scotland)%20Bill/b36s2-introdpm.pdf [hereinafter Policy Memorandum] (“The available evidence suggests that cohabitation has
moved from a minority to a dominant family type in the UK.”); Elaine E. Sutherland, From ‘Bidie-in’
to ‘Cohabitant’ in Scotland: The Perils of Legislative Compromise, 27 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 143, 146
(2013) (referencing the “dramatic increase in the incidence of cohabitation in western countries”
and citing to multiple studies); Waggoner, supra note 2, at 231.
4. See generally 2 COMPARATIVE S UCCESSION LAW: I NTESTATE S UCCESSION (Kenneth G.C.
Reid et al. eds., 2015) (discussing intestate succession in Europe, the United States, Quebec,
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Latin America).
5. The Law Commissions Act 1965 established the SLC as an independent body charged
with advising the Government on ways “to simplify, modernise and improve Scots law.” Welcome to
the Scottish Law Commission, SCOTTISH L. COMMISSION, https://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk (last
visited Apr. 2, 2018).
6. See infra Part II.C.
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both valuing certainty and preferring fixed entitlements and limited judicial
discretion. 7
Specifically, this Article focuses on the law of Scotland to gain insight into
several issues of principle and related issues of execution that should be at the
center of U.S. reform discussions. The first issue of principle relates to
purpose—determining why an intestacy statute should provide rights for an
unmarried committed partner. The Scottish statute is vague as to its purposes.
This Article discusses the implications of this lack of expressed clarity and
demonstrates how U.S. law reform efforts can avoid similar problems. 8 The
second issue of principle regards certainty and administrative convenience.
The desire for certainty and ease of administration with respect to decedents’
estates is a fundamental principle of American succession law, perhaps second
only to the desire to promote donative freedom. 9 Yet, at the same time,
extension of intestate inheritance rights to unmarried committed partners
will inevitably undermine certainty and administrative convenience to some
degree. 10 This objection to U.S. intestacy law reform should be at the
forefront of any reform proposal discussion. Lastly, the third issue of principle
concerns the institution of marriage and the extent to which provision in the
intestacy statute for unmarried committed partners may negatively affect the
institution of marriage and the rights of a decedent’s spouse. 11 This is another
area of great concern for U.S. intestacy law reform 12 and, thus, also should be
at the center of any reform discussion.
This Article also focuses on two issues of execution that have been at the
center of my prior scholarship addressing intestacy reform aimed at better
serving the needs of functional families. 13 First, how should the duration of

7. See infra notes 9, 106–09 (discussing, respectively the preference in U.S. and Scottish
inheritance law for certainty and fixed rights).
8. See infra Parts II.B, III.B.
9. E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital
Inclusion, 41 A RIZ . L. R EV. 1063, 1068, 1076–77 (1999).
10. Id. at 1088.
11. To be clear, the concern is not with the rights of a decedent’s ex-spouse. Rather, a
decedent might die with both a current spouse and an unmarried committed partner where the
decedent failed to obtain a dissolution of her marriage despite having entered into a cohabitation
with one other than her spouse.
12. See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16
L. & I NEQ. 1, 14 (1998) (reporting the view that provision of intestate inheritance rights to
unmarried committed partners is inconsistent with the view of intestacy law as functioning to
support traditional marriage); Sutherland, supra note 3, at 147–49 (discussing arguments against
providing legal rights for cohabitants grounded in a desire to privilege marriage and referencing
several U.S. scholars who have advanced such arguments).
13. See, e.g., E. Gary Spitko, Open Adoption, Inheritance, and the “Uncleing” Principle, 48 S ANTA
CLARA L. R EV. 765, 767 (2008) (“[T]he article proposes reforming intestacy statutes to allow an
adopted child and her birth parent who have maintained a ‘qualifying functional relationship’
following an open adoption to inherit from and through each other as would an aunt or uncle
and a niece or nephew.”); Spitko, supra note 9, at 1068, 1076–77 (arguing that the Uniform
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the cohabitation impact the intestacy calculus? 14 Second, to what extent
should the intestacy provisions be concerned with the relationship between
probate and non-probate means of passing property? More specifically, how
should the will substitutes of the decedent or of the unmarried committed
partner impact the intestacy calculus? 15
Part II.A of the Article begins with a detailed analysis of the Scottish statute
providing for intestate inheritance rights for an unmarried committed partner,
and pays particular attention to issues of execution. 16 Next, Part II.B evaluates
the Scottish statute with respect to each of the three major issues of principle:
(1) fulfillment of purpose; (2) impact on certainty and administrative
convenience; and (3) implications for marriage. 17 Finally, this Part describes
and briefly evaluates the SLC’s proposal to replace the current statute. 18
Then, Part III considers which elements of the Scottish statute and SLC
proposal a U.S. state might use to craft a more inclusive approach to intestacy
while remaining true to the norms of its succession law. 19 This discussion is
framed by my previously published proposal for a model statute that implements
an accrual/multi-factor approach to intestate inheritance rights for unmarried
committed partners. 20 Therefore, Part III provides a detailed description of the
significant features of my proposal 21 and, most importantly, considers how my
proposal for an accrual/multi-factor approach should be updated to reflect and
incorporate the lessons learned from the Scottish experience. 22
II. INTESTATE INHERITANCE RIGHTS FOR UNMARRIED COMMITTED
PARTNERS IN SCOTLAND
A. STRUCTURE
Although part of the United Kingdom, Scotland has a different intestacy
statute than is found in England and Wales. 23 In 2006, Scotland extended
Probate Code’s denial of intestate inheritance rights to surviving same-sex partners is inconsistent
with the hierarchy of values on which the code is based).
14. See generally E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-Factor Approach to Intestate Inheritance Rights
for Unmarried Committed Partners, 81 O R. L. R EV. 255 (2002) (articulating the rationale and
mechanics of the accrual/multi-factor approach).
15. See generally Mary Louise Fellows, E. Gary Spitko, & Charles Q. Strohm, An Empirical
Assessment of the Potential for Will Substitutes to Improve State Intestacy Statutes, 85 I ND . L.J. 409 (2010)
(exploring the relationship between intestacy law and will substitutes regarding decedent
donative intent).
16. See infra Part II.A.
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See Spitko, supra note 14, at 345–49.
21. See infra Part III.A.
22. See infra Part III.B.
23. See Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, c.41, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1964/
41/contents.
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intestate inheritance rights to unmarried partners 24 by enacting the Family
Law (Scotland) 2006 (“Act”), which provides various property and succession
rights to “cohabitant[s].” 25 The statute’s cohabitation provisions are modeled
on recommendations made by the SLC in its 1992 Report on Family Law. 26
1. Definition of Cohabitant
Section 25(1) of the Act defines a “cohabitant” as “a man and a woman
who are (or were) living together as if they were husband and wife; or . . . two
persons of the same sex who are (or were) living together as if they were civil
partners.” 27 The Act provides relatively minimal guidance to a court
considering whether an applicant qualifies as a cohabitant. 28 Section 25(2) of
the Act provides that a court considering whether an applicant is a cohabitant
of another “shall” consider three factors: “(a) the length of the period during
which [the applicant and the other person] have been living together (or
lived together); (b) the nature of their relationship during that period; and
(c) the nature and extent of any financial arrangements subsisting, or which
subsisted, during that period.” 29
Arguably, the last of these factors is broad enough to authorize a court,
in making a section 25 cohabitant determination, to consider either party’s
will-substitute beneficiary designations. 30 Thus, a partner’s designation of the
other partner as a will-substitute beneficiary should weigh in favor of finding
cohabitant status. In contrast, a partner’s beneficiary designation in favor of
someone other than the other partner should weigh against finding
cohabitant status. 31

24. Kerr v. Mangan [2014] CSIH 69 [6]–[8], (2015) SC 17, 19–20 (Scot.).
25. See Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, (ASP 2) §§ 25–29.
26. See SCOTTISH LAW COMM’N, REPORT ON FAMILY LAW, 1992, SLC 135, at 115–27,
https://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/files/5912/8015/2668/Report%20on%20family%20law%20Repo
rt%20135.pdf [hereinafter REPORT ON FAMILY LAW]; SCOTTISH LAW COMM’N, REPORT ON SUCCESSION,
2009, SLC 215, at 66, https://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/files/7112/7989/7451/rep215.pdf
[hereinafter REPORT ON SUCCESSION].
27. Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, (ASP 2) § 25(1).
28. See id. § 25(2).
29. Id.
30. The issue seems not to have been discussed in the debate leading up to enactment
of the Act. See generally Family Law (Scotland) Bill, SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT, http://
www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/Bills/25041.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2018)
(chronicling the legislative history of the bill).
31. See Fellows, Spitko, & Strohm, supra note 15, at 441 (The co-authors’ factorial research
design study found: “With respect to 57% of the vignettes in which the life partner was the willsubstitute beneficiary, the respondent would make the life partner a new heir” and “with respect
to 51% of the vignettes in which the life partner was the will-substitute beneficiary, the
respondent would give the life partner half or more of the probate estate.”).
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2. Rights of Cohabitants
Sections 26 through 29 of the Act provide certain rights to one who has
qualified as a “cohabitant” under section 25. Sections 26 and 27 are relatively
minor provisions that establish presumptions of equal ownership concerning,
respectively, certain household goods and certain money provided by a
partner as an allowance for joint household expenses or property purchased
with that money. 32 Of greater significance, section 28 authorizes a court to
make a financial provision for a cohabitant when the cohabitation ends for a
reason other than the death of a cohabitant. 33
Most importantly for purposes of this Article, section 29 of the Act
provides for a surviving cohabitant’s intestate inheritance rights. 34 This
section applies only when, immediately prior to the intestate decedent’s
death, the decedent was domiciled in Scotland and was cohabiting with the
survivor. 35 Section 29(2) authorizes the court to order payment of a capital
sum or transfer of real or personal property to the survivor from the
decedent’s “net intestate estate.” 36 The net intestate estate is defined as what
remains of the intestate estate after payment of or satisfaction of inheritance
taxes, certain other liabilities of the estate, and the surviving spouse’s or
surviving civil partner’s “legal rights” and “prior rights.” 37
However, section 29 does not provide a fixed intestate share to the
surviving cohabitant. 38 Rather, section 29 gives the court almost unlimited

32. Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, (ASP 2) §§ 26–27.
33. Id. § 28; see also Lindsay v. Murphy (2010) Fam. L.R. 156, 159 [58] (Scot.) (noting the
flexibility that section 28 gives courts to fashion an appropriate award where cohabitation ends
for reasons other than by death and opining that this flexibility “reflect[s] the reality that
cohabitation is a less formal, less structured and more flexible form of relationship than either
marriage or civil partnership”).
34. Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, (ASP 2) § 29. Notably, the Act does not provide for a
surviving cohabitant’s rights when the decedent died testate. See id. §§ 25–29. The Scottish
Executive chose not to include rights against the testate estate because the issue was under review
at the time by the SLC. See R EPORT ON SUCCESSION, supra note 26, at 68–69.
35. Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, (ASP 2) § 29(1)(b)(i)–(ii).
36. Id. § 29(2)(a)(i)–(ii).
37. Id. § 29(10). The legal rights and prior rights that Scottish succession law affords to a
surviving spouse or civil partner often entitle the spouse or civil partner to a significant portion—
frequently all—of the intestate estate. Under Scottish law, however, a surviving spouse or civil
partner is an heir of the “free estate” remaining after legal rights and prior rights only if the
intestate decedent left no issue, parents, siblings, or issue of siblings. Succession (Scotland) Act
1964, c.41, § 2(1)(e), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1964/41/section/2. For a
discussion of the legal rights of a surviving spouse and child and the prior rights of a surviving
spouse, see infra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
38. In its 1992 proposal, the SLC recommended a discretionary provision system for
surviving cohabitants, asserting: “The main advantage of a discretionary system for cohabitants is
that it can take account of the widely differing circumstances of different cases . . . .” REPORT ON
F AMILY L AW, supra note 26, at 122.
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discretion to determine the size of the survivor’s intestate share, if any. 39 The
statute directs the court, in exercising its discretion, to have regard to certain
matters, specifically, “the size and nature of the deceased’s net intestate
estate;” any property passing to the survivor as a “consequence of[] the
decedent’s death; . . . the nature and extent of any other . . . claims on[] the
. . . net intestate estate; and . . . any other matter the court considers
appropriate.” 40 The statute does impose one significant limitation on the
court’s discretion: The intestate share awarded to the survivor may not
“exceed the amount to which the survivor would have been entitled had the
survivor been the spouse or civil partner of the deceased.” 41
As noted, section 29 expressly directs the court to consider, as a factor
influencing the size of the surviving cohabitant’s intestate share, property
passing to the surviving cohabitant as a consequence of the decedent’s death.
This would include property passing to the survivor by a will substitute of the
decedent. The statutory language does not expressly make clear, however,
whether the court ought to consider will-substitute property passing to the
survivor as a type of advancement that should tend to reduce the size of the
intestate share or, instead, as an indicator that the decedent would want the
survivor to be a favored heir, and, thus, to take a relatively larger intestate
share. 42 The only court to have expressly considered the issue has interpreted
the language such that a non-probate transfer to the surviving cohabitant
militates against an award from the net intestate estate. 43
The Act has now been in effect for a dozen years. The case law as well as
commentaries from practitioners, academics, and law reformers evidence how
the Act has worked in practice. The next Part evaluates the Act’s cohabitation
provisions in light of that information.
B. EVALUATION
An evaluation of how the Act’s cohabitation provisions have worked since
their 2006 enactment is hampered by the fact that there have been relatively
few published judicial opinions applying the provisions. 44 In March 2016, the
Justice Committee of the Scottish Parliament published a report titled “Post-

39. See Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, (ASP 2) § 29(3)(d) (authorizing the court to
consider “any . . . matter the court considers appropriate”).
40. Id. § 29(3)(a)–(d).
41. Id. § 29(4).
42. See id. § 29(3)–(4).
43. See Savage v. Purches (2009) S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 36, 41–42 [9]–[11] (Scot.) (noting that a
large pension benefit passing to the surviving cohabitant on the decedent’s death militates
against any award to the survivor under section 29).
44. See JUSTICE COMM., POST-LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY OF THE F AMILY LAW (S COTLAND )
ACT 2006, 2016, SP 963, at 10, http://www.parliament.scot/S4_JusticeCommittee/Reports/
JS042016R06.pdf (noting “[t]he apparent paucity of published judicial determinations on
section 28 cases”).

A11_SPITKO (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

6/11/2018 11:12 PM

INTESTATE INHERITANCE RIGHTS

2183

Legislative Scrutiny of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006,” 45 which
speculated on the reasons for this dearth of published opinions. 46 The report
noted evidence that family law cases generally are under-reported in Scotland
and cited testimony that, “[s]ome sheriffs are possibly reticent to publish
judgments because they are not terribly certain about the approaches that
they have taken to section 28.” 47
Moreover, it is particularly challenging to evaluate the Act’s cohabitation
provisions respecting intestacy because most of the published opinions arose
under section 28, which deals with cohabitations that have terminated due to
breakdown rather than the death of a partner. With this caveat concerning
the limited case law in mind, the Article turns next to evaluate the Act’s
cohabitation provisions respecting intestate inheritance rights.
1. Fulfillment of Purpose
The Policy Memorandum that the Scottish Executive prepared to
accompany the Family Law (Scotland) Bill (which later became the Act)
provides insight into the objectives and values that underpin the Act. 48 In
general, the Scottish Parliament intended for the Act to respond to the
changing nature of family formation by offering new protections to persons
with nontraditional family structures. 49 With respect to cohabitants
specifically, the Policy Memorandum states that the statute seeks to provide a
statutory basis for protecting qualifying cohabitants when their relationship
ends because of a breakdown or the death of a partner. 50
However, the Act does not seek to convey marriage-like rights on
unmarried committed partners. 51 Indeed, the statute seeks to preserve the
special status of marriage in Scottish society. 52 Thus, the rights of a surviving
spouse and the rights of a surviving unmarried cohabitant remain
differentiated under the Act. 53

45. See generally id. (describing the response to the Act).
46. The report took stock of the Act’s effectiveness during the first decade following its
enactment and focused especially on the provisions on cohabitation as well as on certain
provisions on parental responsibilities and rights. Id. at 1–2.
47. Id. at 7 (quoting JUSTICE COMM., SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT, OFFICIAL REPORT OF 9TH MEETING,
2016-4, at 26, http://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/report.aspx?r=10418&mode=pdf).
48. Policy Memorandum, supra note 3, ¶¶ 2–12.
49. Id. ¶¶ 2, 4–5; see also Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, (ASP 2) ¶ 3 Explanatory Notes,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2006/2/notes (“The Act makes a range of provisions
designed to address the legal vulnerabilities experienced by family members in Scotland today
and to ensure that family law protects the best interests of children regardless of the type of family
to which they belong.”).
50. Policy Memorandum, supra note 3, ¶¶ 64–65.
51. Id. ¶ 65.
52. See id. ¶ 70 (stating that the drafters “believe that to regard cohabitation as equivalent
to marriage fails to acknowledge the special place of marriage in Scottish society”).
53. JUSTICE COMM., supra note 44, at 4.
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Finally, as the structure of the statute suggests, the drafters sought to give
courts “the necessary flexibility in interpreting the facts of each case and
discretion in securing fair and just outcomes.” 54 The drafters understood that
cohabiting relationships and the personal circumstances of the cohabitants
vary greatly. Thus, they believed that courts should have broad discretion to
fashion an appropriate outcome based on the facts of any given case. 55
Beyond these general statements of intent, neither the text nor the
legislative history of the Act gives any indication as to the statute’s objectives
in qualifying an applicant under section 25 or providing for an award to the
qualified cohabitant from the net intestate estate under section 29. 56 Thus, a
court applying these sections is without guidance as to what ends it should
seek to promote. 57 This lack of any clearly stated principle to ground these
cohabitation provisions has given rise to great uncertainty in the statute’s
application. 58
Consider, for example, application of section 29’s language regarding
will substitutes. If section 29’s dominant purpose is to implement a reciprocity
or compensation principle or to protect the survivor’s reliance interests or
provide for her needs, then a significant non-probate transfer to the surviving
cohabitant should support courts awarding a reduced intestate share to the
survivor. In contrast, if section 29’s dominant purpose is to promote the
decedent’s unexpressed presumed donative intent, then a significant nonprobate transfer to the surviving cohabitant might support courts awarding
an increased intestate share to the survivor. 59

54. Policy Memorandum, supra note 3, ¶ 75.
55. JUSTICE COMM., supra note 44, at 4.
56. Cf. id. at 10–11 (The Justice Committee of the Scottish Parliament noted comments
submitted to the committee for its ten-year review of the Act which expressed “views that, while
the law on adult relationships—marriage, civil partnership, and cohabitation—in Scotland may
be broadly fit for purpose, it has evolved in a piecemeal fashion over the last decade and a half,
with limited consideration of what the underlying aims and principles of the law should be.”).
The SLC’s 1992 Report on Family Law, which heavily influenced the Act, suggests that the
provision for a surviving cohabitant “may be intended to provide recompense for past
contributions or sacrifices . . . [or] to reflect the view that the deceased, if he had made a will,
would in all probability have made provision for the cohabitant.” REPORT ON F AMILY LAW, supra
note 26, at 122–23.
57. The 1951 report of the “Mackintosh Committee,” which heavily influenced the
Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 and, thus, Scotland’s modern intestacy scheme, opined that the
intestacy statute should provide for distribution of the intestate estate as the decedent most likely
would have wanted the estate to be distributed had she made a will. See SCOTTISH HOME DEP’T,
LAW OF S UCCESSION IN S COTLAND : R EPORT ON THE COMMITTEE OF I NQUIRY, 1951, Cmd.
8144, at 8.
58. See infra notes 75–79, 95–102 and accompanying text.
59. See Fellows, Spitko, & Strohm, supra note 15, at 441 (The results of a factorial research
design study seeking to assess public attitudes about the relationship between will substitutes and
intestacy statutes found that, “[w]ith respect to 57% of the vignettes in which the life partner was
the will-substitute beneficiary, the respondent would make the life partner a new heir.”); Fellows
et al., supra note 12, at 63 (concluding that the naming of a putative committed partner as
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The Act does not expressly instruct courts to focus on the surviving
cohabitant’s needs, reliance interests, and contributions to the decedent’s
economic, physical, or emotional well-being in applying the intestacy
provisions with respect to cohabitants. 60 The structure of the statute, however,
gives courts the discretion to do so. 61 Specifically, section 29(3) expressly
authorizes a court to rely upon “any . . . matter the court considers
appropriate.” 62 Indeed, in the two published opinions in which a court has
discussed at length the reasoning grounding its application of section 29(3)’s
factors influencing the award of an intestate share to a surviving cohabitant, 63
both courts focused their analysis principally on reciprocity/contribution and
reliance/need.
In Windram, Applicant, 64 the court awarded the surviving cohabitant of a
twenty-five-year cohabitation a large share of the intestate estate—an amount
almost equal to what the survivor would have taken of right had she been
married to the decedent. 65 In determining the award, the court focused on
the survivor’s contributions to the decedent’s well-being: For many years she
had been a full-time homemaker and mother to the couple’s children (which
allowed the decedent to focus on his business and financial matters) and she
had taken care of the decedent during his final illness. 66 The court also
focused on the extent to which the survivor had “placed herself in a position
of dependency on the deceased.” 67 In this case, she had merged her finances
with those of the deceased, had left the workforce to care for their children
full-time for eleven years and, even after returning to the workforce, had
worked only part-time in a position that allowed her to care for the children
during school holidays. 68 Finally, the court noted that the survivor had a
continuing obligation to provide care and support for the couple’s children
and would be left financially insecure without a sizeable award from the net
intestate estate. 69
In contrast, in Savage v. Purches, the surviving cohabitant had lived with
the decedent for only two years and six months, ending with the decedent’s

beneficiary of a non-probate means of passing property at death is an “[o]bservable factor[]
closely correspond[ing] to self-definitions of a committed relationship and can be associated with
a preference for having a committed partner inherit”).
60. See Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, (ASP 2) § 29(2)–(4).
61. Id.
62. Id. § 29(3)(d).
63. See Windram, Applicant (2009) Fam. L.R. 157, 161–62 [14]–[18] (Scot.); Savage v.
Purches (2009) S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 36, 39–41 [4]–[8] (Scot.).
64. Windram, at 157.
65. Id. at 162 [18].
66. Id. at 161 [14].
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 162 [15]–[18].
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death. 70 The court noted that the survivor had not contributed to the
mortgage on the decedent’s home and had paid no rent; had changed careers
during the relationship and had been supported financially by the decedent
during the transition; and had made only minor contributions to the
household, such as carrying out limited shopping and paying for dog
grooming and ironing services. 71 After commenting “that there was a distinct
whiff of avarice about the whole action raised by the pursuer,” the court ruled
that the survivor should take nothing from the intestate estate. 72 In doing so,
the court emphasized that the decedent had “considerably enhanced” the
survivor’s standard of living during their cohabitation and that significant
pension benefits had passed to the survivor by discretion of the pension
trustees as a result of the decedent’s death. 73 The short duration of the
cohabitation (less than three years) was also a critical factor for the court in
denying any award under section 29. 74
The lack of clarity with respect to the purpose of the cohabitation provisions,
especially section 29, has been the subject of significant criticisms and calls for
legislative clarification.75 Indeed, Lady Smith, sitting on the Court of Session
(Scotland’s supreme civil court) has noted that section 29’s provisions “provide
little, if any, indication of underlying principle.” 76 Further, she has opined, “[i]f
clarity is to be achieved [in the application of section 29], the current section 29
needs to be replaced with a provision that gives a clear indication not only of the
mischief which it seeks to address but also of the policy underlying whatever
solution is adopted.”77 Similarly, the SLC, in calling for section 29’s repeal and
replacement, has argued that the “potentially infinite” number of relevant factors
for a court to consider in conjunction with a lack of clarity as to purpose yields
too great a degree of uncertainty 78 and that “[t]he court is being asked to do the
impossible: to balance conflicting family interests without any guidance on the
relative weight to be given to the needs and interests of each party.” 79

70. Savage v. Purches (2009) S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 36, 37 [2], [14] (Scot.).
71. Id. at 38 [11].
72. Id. at 40 [5], 42 [14].
73. Id.
74. Id. at 41 [11].
75. See, e.g., Fran Wasoff et al., Legal Practitioners’ Perspectives on the Cohabitation Provisions
of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 31, 136 (Univ. of Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11/03, 2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1736612 (noting critically that section 29 “provides no guidance
about the objective which the court should be seeking to achieve in making any order”).
76. Kerr v. Mangan [2014] CSIH 69 [17], (2015) SC 17, 23 (Scot.).
77. Id. at 24 [19].
78. R EPORT ON S UCCESSION, supra note 26, at 6, 67–68.
79. Id. at 68.
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2. Implications for Certainty and Administrative Convenience
i.

Section 25

Courts and practitioners alike seemingly have not had much difficulty
interpreting or applying section 25. 80 Most of the case law applying section
25’s definition of cohabitant arose in the context of an application under
section 28. Nonetheless, that case law should be informative with respect to
qualifying a cohabitant under section 25 in connection with a claim for an
intestate share under section 29.
In fact, however, very few published opinions discuss cohabitant
qualification at length. 81 In a significant number of cases, the parties
stipulated that the applicant was a cohabitant within the meaning of section
25. 82 In a number of other cases, the court did not discuss the issue at all, but
rather proceeded directly to a section 28 or 29 analysis, 83 or announced a
conclusion regarding cohabitant status after a short presentation of facts and
with little or no section 25 analysis. 84 This limited body of case law may
evidence a general willingness of Scottish courts and the parties themselves to
find or concede cohabitation status under section 25 given that such a finding
80. JUSTICE COMM., supra note 44, at 5 (The Justice Committee noted in its study ten years after
the enactment of the Act: “Overall, we were left with the impression that the definition [of cohabitant
in section 25] is not perfect but appears not to have created significant problems in practice.”); Wasoff
et al., supra note 75, at 124 (discussing their survey of practitioners and concluding “our research did
not find any substantial problems with identifying cohabitation in practice”).
81. But see, e.g., Harley v. Thompson (2015) Fam. L.R. 45, 50 [42] (Scot.) (considering the
cohabitant issue “by looking at the circumstances of the relationship as a whole”); Gutcher v.
Butcher, 2014 WL 4954935 [13]–[17] (Scot.) (official transcript).
82. See, e.g., Gow v. Grant [2012] UKSC 29 [9], [13], (2012) SC 1, 5–6 (Scot.); Lindsay v.
Murphy (2010) Fam. L.R. 156, 158 [1] (Scot.); Savage v. Purches (2009) S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 36, 40
[7] (Scot.); see also Courtney’s Executors v. Campbell (2016) CSOH 136, 2016 WL 05930096
[70] (Scot.) (dismissing estate’s claim for unjust enrichment where the parties did not dispute
that the deceased and the defendant had been cohabitants within the meaning of section 25 yet
the deceased had failed to pursue a remedy under section 28 after breakup).
83. See generally Kerr v. Mangan [2014] CSIH 69, (2015) SC 17 (Scot.) (proceeding directly
to section 29 analysis in a case in which the applicant had lived with the decedent for 22 years);
Whigham v. Owen [2013] CSOH 29, (2013) S.L.T. 483 (Scot.) (proceeding directly to section
28 analysis in a case in which the parties had lived together for more than 26 years); Mitchell v.
Gibson (2011) Fam. L.R. 53 (Scot.) (proceeding directly to section 28 analysis in a case in which
the parties had lived together for two years).
84. See, e.g., Windram, Applicant (2009) Fam. L.R. 157, 160 [3] (Scot.) (explaining that the
court “had no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the deceased and the pursuer [in a
section 29 case] were cohabitants within the meaning of s[ection] 25” where the couple had lived
together for 25 years, had raised two children together, and the pursuer had cared for the
decedent during his last illness); Chebotareva v. Khandro (2008) Fam. L.R. 66, 70 [19] (Scot.)
(concluding, in a section 29 case, that the deceased and the pursuer had been section 25
cohabitants given that they had been in a “long relationship” of which certain family members
had knowledge; had cohabited for a little over one year; the deceased had “claimed that he loved
the pursuer very much”; and the deceased had been prepared to attend the pursuer’s
immigration hearing and had stated that he would accompany her to her home country if she
had to return there).
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does not of itself entitle the qualified cohabitant to any financial provision
under section 28 or any share of the decedent’s intestate estate under
section 29. 85
Section 25 instructs the court, in making a determination as to whether
an applicant qualifies as a cohabitant, to consider the length of the
cohabitation period, but does not impose a minimum duration of the
cohabitation for an applicant to qualify. 86 The statute is not intended to
extend protections to cohabitants of a short-term cohabitation. 87 Rather,
“[t]he intention is to create legal safeguards for the protection of cohabitants
in long-standing and enduring relationships.” 88 Nevertheless, the drafters
purposefully declined to establish a minimum cohabitation period
concluding, “[i]t would be arbitrary, rigid and unresponsive to individual
cases; would create problems of proof; could distort behavior; and could lead
to especially harsh outcomes in relation to discretionary awards on death.” 89
The drafters predicted that, over time, case law would clarify which types of
cohabiting relationships and surrounding circumstances would likely give rise
to a successful claim under the Act. 90 However, more than a decade after the
statute’s enactment, no such sufficient body of case law has arisen.
Still, section 25’s failure to provide for a minimum cohabitation period
for an applicant to qualify has not created significant difficulties. 91 Professor
Fran Wasoff and her colleagues surveyed practitioners who had handled
section 25 cases. They found that very few cases involved a cohabitation of less
than two years and relatively few cases involved a cohabitation of less than five
years. 92 The researchers concluded that “cohabitations of short duration
could very well rule themselves out.” 93 Moreover, concern that section 25 may

85. See, e.g., Chebotareva at 70 [19]–[20] (finding section 25 cohabitation status where the
parties “had lived together for a year and a few months” but holding that the pursuer’s section
29 claim failed because the decedent had not been domiciled in Scotland at his death).
86. Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, (ASP 2) § 25(2)(a).
87. Policy Memorandum, supra note 3, ¶ 67.
88. Id.; see also JUSTICE 1 COMM., STAGE 1 REPORT ON FAMILY LAW (SCOTLAND) BILL, 2005-2,
SP 401, ¶ 179 (citing oral testimony indicating that the bill is intended to apply to long-lasting
cohabitations and not to short-term relationships).
89. Policy Memorandum, supra note 3, ¶ 67; see also Sutherland, supra note 3, at 151 (“The
lack of a fixed minimum cohabitation period avoids arbitrary injustice to a pursuer . . . who misses
the qualifying time by a small margin.”).
90. Policy Memorandum, supra note 3, ¶ 68.
91. Wasoff et al., supra note 75, at 125 (concluding from their survey of practitioners that
the lack of a minimum duration requirement in section 25 “does not appear to have created
problems”); see also Sutherland, supra note 3, at 151 (reaching the same conclusion in the context
of court workload).
92. Wasoff et al., supra note 75, at 125; see also Gow v. Grant [2012] UKSC 29 [52], (2012)
SC 1, 17–18 (Scot.) (citing research by Wasoff and her colleagues, and concluding that the lack
of a qualifying duration for the cohabitation “has not proved a problem”).
93. Wasoff et al., supra note 75, at 89; cf. R EPORT ON F AMILY L AW, supra note 26, at 116
(positing that its recommendations would “be self-limiting (in the sense that a short cohabitation
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allow the survivor of a transient relationship to qualify as a cohabitant entitled
to assert a section 29 claim might be lessened by the fact that the court may
again consider the short duration of the cohabitation in its section 29 analysis,
under “any other matter the court considers appropriate.” 94
ii.

Section 29

Section 29 has generated significant criticism from Scottish judges, law
reformers, academics, and practitioners relating to the uncertainty that arises
from the section’s grant of nearly unfettered discretion to the courts. 95 Lady
Smith has opined that, “[t]he factors specified in subsec[tion] (3) are obvious
but limited and the ability to have regard to ‘any other matter the court
considers appropriate’ gives no useful guidance at all.” 96 She has concluded,
“[i]n the end of the day, the court’s discretion is so unfettered as to make it
extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to predict accurately what may be
the outcome, at first instance, of an application under sec[tion] 29.” 97 Lord
Drummond Young, also sitting on the Court of Session, similarly has
commented, “[t]he lack of statutory criteria for an award [under section 29]
makes the task of the court extremely difficult . . . . In my view reform of the
law in this area is clearly desirable.” 98 The SLC likewise has noted the difficulty
of predicting how a court may rule upon a section 29 application and, thus,
has called for replacement of section 29 “with a simpler provision [that] will
greatly reduce the extent of the court’s discretion” and that “will make the
outcome of litigation easier to predict and therefore encourage parties to
negotiate a settlement without resort to court.” 99

or one involving little mutual commitment would be likely to give rise to minimal legal
consequences)”).
94. See Savage v. Purches (2009) S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 36, 36 [11] (Scot.) (considering the short
duration of the cohabiting relationship a relevant factor under section 29(3)(d), which covers
“any other matter the Court considers appropriate”); see also Windram, Applicant (2009) Fam.
L.R. 157, 161 [14] (Scot.) (listing the long duration of the cohabitation as a factor justifying a
large award from the intestate estate).
95. See, e.g., JUSTICE 1 COMM., supra note 88, ¶ 208 (expressing “concern[] at the wide
discretion that the current drafting leaves to the court in determining the appropriate amount
that should be awarded” and expressing a preference that the legislation give further guidance
to the courts); JUSTICE COMM., supra note 44, at 5 (noting that comments submitted to the Justice
Committee of the Scottish Parliament raised the issue of the vague nature of section 29 and the
consequent difficulty of advising clients of a likely outcome of a section 29 application); Wasoff
et al., supra note 75, at 63–64, 70–71, 103–04, 107 (reporting various comments of practitioners
criticizing section 29’s broad grant of discretion and seeking greater clarity).
96. Kerr v. Mangan [2014] CSIH 69 [17], (2015) SC 17, 23 (Scot.) (quoting Family Law
(Scotland) Act 2006, (ASP 2) § 29(3)(d)).
97. Id. at 24 [18].
98. Id. at 30 [48] (Lord Drummond Young, concurring).
99. R EPORT ON S UCCESSION, supra note 26, at 67–68. The SLC’s proposal more precisely
specifies criteria to determine who should qualify as a cohabitant and to calculate the portion of
the intestate estate that a qualified cohabitant should take. See id. at 70–71, 73.
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The Wasoff survey of practitioners found significant dissatisfaction
among practitioners with section 29’s broad grant of discretion. 100 Professor
Wasoff and her colleagues have concluded that section 29’s broad discretion
“undermines its wider objectives, as well as the broad policy objective of
encouraging private ordering within a clear framework of principles that
characterises so much else in Scottish family law.” 101 Thus, they have called
for reform that would give greater guidance to courts considering a surviving
cohabitant’s claim for an award from the decedent’s intestate estate. 102
Understanding that cohabitation relationships and the personal
circumstances of the cohabitants vary tremendously, however, the Act’s
drafters took the position that courts should have broad discretion to fashion
a just award depending on the facts of the case. 103 Professor Kenneth Norrie
has criticized this thinking. 104 He points out that marital relationships and the
personal circumstances of the spouses also vary greatly, yet, Scottish law gives
more explicit guidance to courts with respect to the division of marital
property and recent scholarship has shown that this approach works well in
Scotland. 105
Indeed, the nature and degree of discretion that section 29 grants to
courts applying the provision is very much out of step with the preference for
certainty and administrative convenience found in Scottish family law and
succession law generally, which tend to rely upon fixed entitlements rather
than judicial discretion. 106 Most notably, Scotland, unlike England and
Wales, 107 does not provide for a discretionary family maintenance system to
guard against disinheritance. Rather, Scottish law’s protections against
disinheritance provide to a surviving spouse or civil partner fixed “prior
rights” in the decedent’s intestate estate, 108 and to a surviving spouse or civil
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Wasoff et al., supra note 75, at 138.
Id. at 139.
Id.
Policy Memorandum, supra note 3, ¶ 75; JUSTICE COMM., supra note 44, at 4.
JUSTICE COMM., supra note 44, at 9.
Id.
Kenneth G.C. Reid, Intestate Succession in Scotland, in 2 COMPARATIVE SUCCESSION L AW:
I NTESTATE S UCCESSION, supra note 4, at 370, 396 (stating that discretion in section 29 is
“unique[] in Scottish succession law”); Frankie McCarthy, Rights in Succession for Cohabitants:
Savage v Purches, 13 EDINBURGH L. REV. 325, 328 (2009) (noting that the Scottish law of intestate
succession does not allow for consideration of “the equity of the situation”); Wasoff et al., supra
note 75, at 31–32, 138.
107. See Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, c.63 (Eng. & Wales),
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1975/63/contents.
108. Prior rights may be asserted only by a surviving spouse or civil partner and only if the
decedent has died intestate. Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, c.41, § 8,
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1964/41/section/8. The spouse or civil partner enjoys three
types of prior rights. First, the spouse or civil partner is entitled to the marital dwelling house in which
the spouse or civil partner lived with the decedent at the time of the decedent’s death up to a value of
300,000 GBP in 2006 and 473,000 GBP as of February 1, 2012. Id. § 8(1); The Prior Rights of Surviving
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partner and children fixed “legal rights” in the decedent’s testate or intestate
estate. 109 Unlike with a family maintenance system, the Scottish scheme
guarding against disinheritance of a spouse or child does not afford any
discretion to the court in setting the amount of prior rights or legal rights.
3. Implications for Marriage
The principal objection to the Family Law (Scotland) Bill’s provisions
granting legal protections to unmarried committed partners was “that this
would undermine marriage and discourage people from marrying.” 110 The
drafters themselves sought to avoid undermining marriage when they were
drafting the Act’s cohabitation provisions. As the Policy Memorandum states,
Spouse (Scotland) Order 2005, SI 2005/252; The Prior Rights of Surviving Spouse and Civil
Partner (Scotland) Order 2011, SI 2011/436. Second, the spouse or civil partner is entitled to
the furniture and furnishings of the marital dwelling house up to a value of 24,000 GBP in 2006
and 29,000 GBP as of February 1, 2012. Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, c.41, § 8(3),
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1964/41/section/8; The Prior Rights of Surviving Spouse
(Scotland) Order 2005, SI 2005/252; The Prior Rights of Surviving Spouse and Civil Partner
(Scotland) Order 2011, SI 2011/436. Finally, the spouse or civil partner is entitled to a cash sum, the
amount of which depends upon whether the decedent is survived by issue. Succession (Scotland) Act
1964, c.41, § 9, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1964/41/section/9. In 2006, the surviving
spouse or civil partner was entitled to 42,000 GBP if the decedent was survived by issue, and up to
75,000 GBP if the decedent was not survived by issue. See The Prior Rights of Surviving Spouse
(Scotland) Order 2005, SI 2005/252. As of February 1, 2012, those amounts increased to 50,000 GBP
and 89,000 GBP respectively. See The Prior Rights of Surviving Spouse and Civil Partner (Scotland)
Order 2011, SI 2011/436.
109. SCOTTISH EXEC., RIGHTS OF SUCCESSION: A BRIEF GUIDE TO THE SUCCESSION (SCOTLAND) ACT
1964, at 3 (2005), http://www.gov.scot/Resource/Doc/47121/0020437.pdf. Legal rights may be
claimed by a surviving spouse or civil partner and also by a surviving child. Succession (Scotland) Act
1964, c.41, §§ 8, 9, & 11(1), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1964/41/contents; SCOTTISH
EXEC., supra, at 2. Such rights of a child are called legitim. Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, c.41,
§ 11(1), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1964/41/section/11. The issue of a predeceasing
child can assert the legal rights of the predeceasing child. Id. Legal rights may be claimed against the
testate estate or the intestate estate. SCOTTISH EXEC., supra, at 2–4. When the decedent dies testate, the
spouse or civil partner or child must elect either to take any testamentary provision in their favor or
claim legal rights. Id. at 4. When the decedent dies intestate, the spouse or civil partner or child can
claim legal rights out of the intestate estate, but only after satisfaction of the spouse or civil partner’s
prior rights. Id. at 2. An interesting feature of Scottish legal rights is that they depend upon the
form of the estate. Legal rights may be claimed only out of the decedent’s personal property,
known as the “moveable estate.” Civil Partnership Act 2004, c.33, § 131 (Eng. & Wales),
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/33/section/131; Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, c.41,
§ 10(2), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1964/41/section/10; SCOTTISH EXEC., supra, at 2.
The decedent is free to devise her real property, known as the “heritable estate,” by will as she sees fit.
Id. at 2. If the deceased is not survived by issue, a spouse or civil partner is entitled to claim a sum of
money equal to half the value of the net moveable estate. Civil Partnership Act 2004, c.33, § 131(1)
(Eng. & Wales), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/33/section/131. If the deceased is
survived by issue, a spouse or civil partner is entitled to claim a sum of money equal to one-third the
value of the net moveable estate. Id. § 131(2). If the deceased is not survived by a spouse or civil partner,
the decedent’s children are entitled to a sum of money equal to half the moveable estate. SCOTTISH
EXEC., supra, at 2. Finally, if the deceased is survived by a spouse or civil partner, the children are entitled
to a sum of money equal to one-third of the remains of the net moveable estate. Id.
110. Policy Memorandum, supra note 3, ¶ 77.
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“[t]he Scottish Ministers are clear that marriage has a special place in society
and that its distinctive legal status should be preserved.” 111 Indeed, survey data
suggest that there is strong support within the Scottish succession and family
law bars for maintaining a clear distinction between the rights of married
people and the rights of unmarried cohabitants. 112
In several ways, the cohabitation provisions reflect the drafters’ desire to
protect the institution of marriage. First, the Act differentiates the rights of a
surviving unmarried cohabitant from the rights of a surviving spouse or civil
partner. 113 Second, the award to the qualified cohabitant from the intestate
estate may not exceed the value of the portion of the intestate estate to which
the cohabitant “would have been entitled had [she] been the [decedent’s]
spouse or civil partner” at the decedent’s death. 114 Finally, for situations in
which the decedent is survived by both a spouse or civil partner and a
cohabitant, the cohabitant’s rights are subordinate to the prior rights and
legal rights of the spouse or civil partner. 115 These rights entitle the spouse or
civil partner to claim up to 591,000 GBP plus one-half of the value of the
moveable property in the intestate estate. 116 As a result, in many cases where
the decedent is survived by a spouse and a cohabitant, after prior rights, legal
rights, taxes, and expenses are paid, there will be nothing left of the intestate
estate from which the cohabitant’s share might be awarded.
C. THE SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION REFORM PROPOSAL
In its April 2009 Report on Succession, the SLC recommended radical
reform of Scottish succession law including that Parliament repeal section 29
of the Act and replace it with a set of rights for surviving cohabitants that
would apply to both testate and intestate estates. 117 The SLC’s Report is

111. Id. ¶ 71; see also REPORT ON FAMILY LAW, supra note 26, at 115 (recommending reform to
extend legal rights to heterosexual cohabitants and stating as a goal to not undermine marriage).
112. See Wasoff et al., supra note 75, at 93–96 (discussing survey responses as to the distinction
between married people and cohabitants).
113. See JUSTICE COMM., supra note 44, at 4 (“[T]he legal consequences of marriage and
cohabitation should remain clearly differentiated.”).
114. Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, (ASP 2) § 29(4).
115. Id. § 29(2), (10); see also SCOTTISH LAW COMM’ N, T HE E FFECTS OF COHABITATION IN
PRIVATE L AW, 1990, Discussion Paper No. 86, at 46 (acknowledging that the argument that
granting intestate inheritance rights to cohabitants would devalue marriage “might have some
plausibility if the rules on intestacy were to provide that a cohabitant were to be preferred to a
legal spouse, where the deceased was survived by both”).
116. See The Prior Rights of Surviving Spouse and Civil Partner (Scotland) Order 2011,
SI 2011/436.
117. REPORT ON SUCCESSION, supra note 26, at 69. The proposed draft Succession (Scotland)
Bill is set forth at pages 135–83 of the Report on Succession, with the proposed provisions
concerning cohabitants set forth at pages 155–60. See Succession (Scotland) Bill (Draft), in
REPORT ON SUCCESSION, supra note 26, app. A, at 135–83. In April 2016, the Succession
(Scotland) Act 2016 came into force. See generally Succession (Scotland) Act 2016, (ASP 7),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2016/7/contents/enacted. The Succession Act implemented
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unclear as to the purposes or values that ground its reform proposal, offering
only vague hints such as, “a cohabitant’s rights of succession should reflect the
quality of the relationship which the couple had.” 118 A single passage in the
report suggests obliquely that a dominant purpose is to reward contribution:
In explaining why the proposed statute does not take account of will
substitutes passing to the cohabitant upon the decedent’s death or the
interests of the decedent’s other relatives, the Report directs, “[t]he court has
to decide to what extent the surviving cohabitant deserves to be treated as the
deceased’s spouse or civil partner for the purposes of the rules of succession.
Other factors . . . are irrelevant.” 119 As discussed below, the proposed statute
itself directs the court to focus on the surviving cohabitant’s contributions to
the relationship as one of only three factors the court may consider in setting
“the appropriate percentage” of the estate to which the surviving cohabitant
would have been entitled had she been the decedent’s spouse or civil
partner. 120
The SLC proposal defines a cohabitant as one who, immediately before
the decedent’s death, was not the decedent’s spouse or civil partner yet was
“living with the deceased in a relationship which had the characteristics of the
relationship between spouses or civil partners.” 121 The statute further provides
that in determining whether the applicant was living in such a relationship,
the court should focus on five factors:
(a) whether they were members of the same household,
(b) the stability of their relationship,
(c) whether their relationship was sexual,
(d) whether they had children together, or had accepted children
as children of the family, and

many of the reforms the SLC proposed in its 2009 Report on Succession, but did not address
intestacy reform or the rights of cohabitants. See generally id. In June 2015, the Scottish Government
issued a consultation paper concerning intestacy reform, protection from disinheritance under a
will, and the rights of cohabitants. See generally THE SCOTTISH GOV’T, CONSULTATION ON THE LAW OF
SUCCESSION, June 2015, Consultation Paper, http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0048/00480484.pdf.
The proposed reforms, which would subject agricultural lands to the forced share of a surviving
spouse, civil partner, and cohabitant, have met considerable opposition from agricultural interests.
See Barney Thompson, Scottish Landowners Resist Inheritance Reform, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2014),
https://www.ft.com/content/cf3e3a38-7f01-11e4-a828-00144feabdc0 (discussing the concern of
some Scottish landowners that proposed succession law reforms would result in the splitting of large
estates of land to the extent that such estates would no longer be viable as businesses).
118. R EPORT ON S UCCESSION, supra note 26, at 69.
119. Id. at 72.
120. Succession (Scotland) Bill (Draft), in R EPORT ON SUCCESSION , supra note 26,
app. A, at 155, 157.
121. Id. at 155.
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(e) whether they appeared to family, friends and members of the
public to be persons who were married to, in civil partnership with
or cohabitants of each other. 122
The drafters’ note accompanying this section makes clear that the list is
not exclusive. Rather, the court may consider any other factor that the court
thinks relevant to the cohabitant determination and no factor should be
considered more important than any other. 123
The SLC proposal would provide a qualified surviving cohabitant an
“appropriate percentage” of the testate or intestate estate to which the
surviving cohabitant would have been entitled had she been the decedent’s
spouse or civil partner. 124 This percentage, which may not exceed 100%, “is
designed to express the extent to which the cohabitant should be treated, for
the purposes of succession, as if he or she had been married to, or in civil
partnership with, the deceased.” 125 The court is directed to determine the
appropriate percentage based exclusively on three factors:
(a) the length of the period of cohabitation,
(b) the interdependence, financial or otherwise, [of the partners]
during the period of their cohabitation, [and]
(c) what [the survivor] contributed to their life together (whether
such contributions were financial or otherwise) as for example—
(i) running the household,
(ii) caring for [the deceased], [or]
(iii) caring for any children that [the partners] had together or
had accepted as children of the family. 126
Accordingly, the court may not consider the size of the decedent’s estate
or the identity of other beneficiaries or heirs of the estate in setting the
appropriate percentage. 127
In greatly reducing the number of factors that a court may consider in
setting the amount of the surviving cohabitant’s award from the decedent’s
estate to only three, the SLC proposal would increase predictability and
decrease litigation costs as compared to the Act’s cohabitation provisions.
Significantly, the court would no longer have discretion to consider the
122. Id.
123. Id. § 22(4), at 155–56.
124. Id. § 22(3), at 155; see also R EPORT ON S UCCESSION, supra note 26, at 6 (discussing
the rationale grounding the proposed “appropriate percentage” and the factors that a
court should consider in setting the percentage).
125. REPORT ON SUCCESSION, supra note 26, at 6; see also Succession (Scotland) Bill (Draft)
§ 22(3), in REPORT ON SUCCESSION, supra note 26, app. A, at 155 (implementing these principles).
126. Succession (Scotland) Bill (Draft) § 23(2), in R EPORT ON S UCCESSION, supra note 26,
app. A, at 157.
127. Id. at 158.
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competing needs and contributions of other claimants. Still, after considering
the evidence relating to the three relevant factors, the court would retain
tremendous discretion in awarding to the cohabitant the “appropriate
percentage” of the decedent’s estate to which she would have been entitled
had she been the decedent’s spouse or civil partner. 128
Finally, as under the Act, the SLC proposal would allow a surviving
cohabitant to assert a claim against the decedent’s estate even if a spouse or
civil partner survived the decedent also. If the decedent died testate survived
by a spouse or civil partner, the cohabitant’s legal claim against the testate
estate would not impair the surviving spouse or civil partner’s legal claim: The
testate estate may fully satisfy the legal rights of both the spouse and
cohabitant. 129
If, however, the decedent died intestate survived by a spouse or civil
partner, the surviving cohabitant’s successful claim would necessarily impair
the right of the spouse or civil partner to an intestate share. The SLC proposal
provides that the intestate share to which the spouse or civil partner otherwise
would be entitled is to be shared with the successful cohabitant. Specifically,
the cohabitant is entitled to an “appropriate percentage” of one-half of the
spouse or civil partner’s intestate share, to be deducted from the share of the
surviving spouse or civil partner. 130 In this way, the SLC proposal is less
solicitous of the special place that marriage holds in Scottish society and of
the rights of a surviving spouse as compared to the Act’s cohabitation
provisions.
III. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE SCOTTISH EXPERIENCE: SUGGESTIONS
FOR U.S. INTESTACY LAW REFORM
Part II of this Article discussed and evaluated the Scottish provisions for
an unmarried cohabitant’s intestate inheritance rights. This Part now ponders
how the Scottish experience might profitably inform U.S. intestacy law reform
efforts. U.S. law reformers should consider not only what might be borrowed
from Scottish law but also how the Scottish provisions might be improved. The
critical task is to situate the lessons learned from an examination of the
Scottish experience within the context of U.S. succession law. Thus, especially
where Scottish law reflects values that are inconsistent with the values that
underpin U.S. succession law, U.S. law reformers should focus on how the
relevant provisions must be altered if they are to function well in the U.S.
context.

128. See Sutherland, supra note 3, at 164 (noting that “[a]n element of discretion would
remain” with respect to setting the “appropriate percentage”).
129. Succession (Scotland) Bill (Draft), in REPORT ON SUCCESSION, supra note 26, app. A, at 158.
130. Id.
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A. LESSONS LEARNED
The Scottish experience respecting intestate inheritance rights for
unmarried cohabitants offers several important lessons for U.S. law reformers
contemplating how best to structure an intestacy statute to provide for
unmarried committed partners. With respect to fulfillment of purpose, it is
critically important that the statute specify the purposes and values that
ground the cohabitation provisions. A clear statement of purposes can guide
and cabin a court’s discretion in applying the statute. Indeed, any factors that
the statute sets out to guide the court’s discretion should themselves derive
from the purposes and values that ground the cohabitation provisions.
In relation to certainty and administrative convenience, perhaps the
principal lesson to take away from the Scottish experience is that the tolerance
for uncertainty in the intestacy statute’s cohabitation provisions should reflect
the tolerance for uncertainty found in the society’s succession law generally.
Moreover, where a great degree of certainty is desired, a statute that allows a
court to base its award not only on specified factors but also on “any other
matter the court considers appropriate” is likely to be problematic. 131 Finally,
the Scottish experience somewhat undermines the argument that the failure
of an intestacy statute providing for cohabitants to impose a minimum
cohabitation period will tend to produce costly and protracted litigation of
frivolous claims, at least where the scheme is structured so that qualification
as a cohabitant does not automatically entitle the qualified cohabitant to a
significant portion of the intestate estate.
With respect to the institution of marriage, a statute providing for
intestate inheritance rights for unmarried cohabitants should be drafted with
the interests of a surviving spouse and the special status of marriage within the
society in mind. Many would argue this point as a normative matter. 132 As a
practical matter, observing this principle should tend to lessen opposition to
enactment of protections for unmarried committed partners from those
concerned that protecting unmarried cohabitants will undermine marriage
and discourage people from marrying. 133
In applying these lessons to the context of U.S. succession law, this Part
uses as its jumping-off point for discussion my 2002 proposal for an
accrual/multi-factor approach to intestate inheritance rights for unmarried

131. See Kerr v. Mangan [2014] CSIH 69 [17], (2015) SC 17, 23 (Scot.) (“[T]he ability to
have regard to ‘any other matter the court considers appropriate’ gives no useful guidance at all.”
(quoting Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, (ASP 2) § 29(3)(d))).
132. See Policy Memorandum, supra note 3, ¶ 77 (noting that fears of undermining marriage
and discouraging people from marrying were “main reasons in opposition to the proposal” to
extend intestate inheritance rights to unmarried committed partners).
133. But see Sutherland, supra note 3, at 166–67 (arguing that cohabitants should be provided
with the same default legal consequences as married couples on breakdown of the relationship).
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committed partners (“2002 proposal”). 134 First, this Part summarizes the most
important features of the 2002 proposal. This Part then considers how the
2002 proposal might advantageously be modified in light of the lessons
learned from the Scottish experience and consistent with the values that
ground U.S. succession law.
B. A REVISED ACCRUAL/MULTI-FACTOR APPROACH
The 2002 proposal defines a “committed partner” as one who lived “with
the decedent as a couple in an emotionally and physically intimate
partnership such that the intestacy scheme should protect the decedent’s
interest in donative freedom, or the surviving committed partner’s reciprocity
or reliance interests, by awarding to the survivor a portion of the decedent’s
intestate estate.” 135 The proposal then identifies twenty-three non-exclusive
factors that a court shall consider to qualify a committed partner for the
purposes of the intestacy statute. These factors are grouped according to the
element of the cohabitant definition that they tend to demonstrate: that the
parties lived life together as “emotionally and physically intimate” partners;
that the decedent would have wanted her intestate estate to provide for the
survivor; that the survivor contributed to the decedent’s physical, mental, or
economic well-being; or that the survivor relied upon her relationship with
the decedent to her economic detriment. 136
The 2002 proposal is structured so that one who qualifies as a surviving
committed partner is entitled to a specified portion of the decedent’s intestate
estate. 137 The qualified partner’s portion increases according to a fixed
schedule as the duration of the cohabitation period increases. For example,
“the unreduced intestate share percentage” for the qualified survivor of a
cohabitation that lasted more than three years but less than four years is 18%
of the intestate estate while that portion increases to 100% for a cohabitation
that lasted fifteen years or more. 138 However, the relevant percentage is
reduced by specified amounts if the decedent left issue who are not issue of
the survivor, left a parent or parents but no issue, or if the relationship
fractured within a specified period prior to the decedent’s death. 139
1. Fulfillment of Purpose
The 2002 proposal is expressly grounded in three specific purposes:
(1) to promote the decedent’s unexpressed donative intent; (2) to recognize
134. See generally Spitko, supra note 14 (articulating the rationale and mechanics of the
accrual/multi-factor approach).
135. Id. app. b, at 346.
136. Id. app. b, at 346–48.
137. The surviving committed partner must have cohabited with the decedent for at least
three years to qualify for a portion of the decedent’s intestate estate. Id. app. b, at 345.
138. Id.
139. Id. app. b, at 345–46.
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the surviving unmarried committed partner’s contributions to the intestate
decedent’s economic, physical, or emotional well-being; and (3) to protect
the survivor’s reliance interests in the relationship. 140 These purposes are
incorporated into the proposal’s very definition of cohabitant. 141 Moreover,
the factors that the court must consider in qualifying a surviving cohabitant
are designed to operationalize the statute’s objectives in that the factors derive
from the proposal’s purposes and the factors are categorized accordingly.
Finally, the accrual schedule itself also is designed to operationalize the
proposal’s purposes: The likelihood that the decedent would want to provide
for the survivor, that the survivor contributed to the decedent’s well-being,
and that the survivor came to rely upon the relationship for her own economic
well-being all increase as the length of cohabitation increases. 142
Nevertheless, the Scottish experience teaches that interpretive
difficulties arise from an ambiguous purpose and, therefore, suggests that the
2002 proposal might beneficially be revised to clarify how courts should
operationalize the proposal’s purposes via the multi-factor test. The revised
proposal should make clear that the definition of cohabitant is partially
disjunctive: If the court finds that the couple lived life together as a couple in
an emotionally and physically intimate partnership and also finds sufficient
evidence of either (1) the decedent’s intent to favor the survivor; (2) the
survivor’s contributions to the decedent’s well-being; or (3) the survivor’s
reliance on the relationship, then the test is satisfied. Thus, an utter lack of
evidence to support a finding in favor of cohabitation status with respect to
one or even two of the factors does not cancel out evidence supporting a
finding in favor of cohabitation status with respect to the remaining factors. 143
2. Implications for Certainty and Administrative Convenience
The 2002 proposal includes a minimum three-year cohabitation period
before a surviving partner may assert a claim for an intestate share. 144 In favor
of this prerequisite, I have previously argued, “[t]his requirement greatly
promotes certainty by narrowing the pool of potential claimants and
eliminating those potential claimants most likely to have a weak or borderline
claim.” 145 Indeed, foreign jurisdictions that grant intestate inheritance rights
to a surviving cohabitant typically require that the couple had cohabited for a

140. Id. at 262, 269–83.
141. Id. app. b, at 346 (defining a surviving committed partner as one who “lived her or his
life together with the decedent as a couple in an emotionally and physically intimate partnership
such that the intestacy scheme should protect the decedent’s interest in donative freedom, or the
surviving committed partner’s reciprocity or reliance interests, by awarding to the survivor a
portion of the decedent’s intestate estate”).
142. Id. at 295–300.
143. See id. at 325 n.240 (stating that the 2002 proposal was drafted with this intent).
144. Id. at 264, 345.
145. Id. at 264, 318–19.
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minimum period, ranging from two to five years, or else had parented a child
together. 146
The cost of including a minimum cohabitation period is that the statute
will not protect some “deserving” unmarried committed partners who were in
a short-term cohabitation. The implicit conclusion grounding imposition of a
minimum cohabitation period is that the increase in certainty and
administrative convenience gained by including the prerequisite is worth this
cost. The Scottish experience under the Act, however, suggests that the
benefit will not outweigh the cost in an accrual/multi-factor system such as
the 2002 proposal.
The Scottish experience under the Act undermines the argument in
favor of a minimum cohabitation period, at least with respect to a system—
such as that provided for by the Act—in which qualification as a cohabitant
does not automatically entitle one to a significant portion of the intestate
estate. The Act does not provide for a minimum cohabitation period; yet this
omission has not led to a large number of applicants from short-term
relationships and has not given courts difficulty in applying the statute. 147
Moreover, empirical data from the United Kingdom generally and
Scotland specifically suggest that many short-term cohabitants may be worthy
intestate takers. 148 Although the data suggest that the vast majority of
cohabitations are transient, lasting a median of two to three years before
converting into marriage or breakup, marriage, rather than breakup, is the
more common reason for cohabitation termination. 149 This is true also of
cohabitation in the United States, suggesting that the cost of excluding shortterm cohabitants would be significant. 150 Specifically, in the United States,
more than half of first cohabitations can be expected to transition to marriage
within three years, and nearly two-thirds of first cohabitations can be expected
to transition to marriage within five years. 151
This empirical data and the Scottish experience with the Act support the
argument that the 2002 proposal should be amended to remove the

146. Kenneth G.C. Reid et al., Intestate Succession in Historical and Comparative Perspective, in
2 COMPARATIVE SUCCESSION L AW: I NTESTATE S UCCESSION, supra note 4, at 442, 506.
147. See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text.
148. See Wasoff et al., supra note 75, at 14 (discussing data on cohabitation dissolutions and
transitions into marriage in the United Kingdom and in Scotland).
149. Policy Memorandum, supra note 3, ¶¶ 57–58 (“About two-thirds of cohabitations result
in marriage and the remaining third mostly dissolve within 10 years. . . . Given that cohabitation
is more common among younger people, key commentators expect both the incidence and
duration of cohabitation to increase over time.”).
150. See Waggoner, supra note 2, at 215 (noting that most cohabitants “either break up or
get married fairly quickly”).
151. PAULA Y. GOODWIN ET AL ., U.S. DEP ’ T OF H EALTH & H UMAN SERVS., M ARRIAGE
AND C OHABITATION IN THE U NITED S TATES : A S TATISTICAL P ORTRAIT B ASED ON C YCLE 6
(2002) OF THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF F AMILY G ROWTH 3, 13 (2010), https://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_028.pdf.
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minimum cohabitation prerequisite. Recall that the 2002 proposal provides
for an unreduced intestate share percentage of 18% of the intestate estate for
the qualified survivor of a cohabitation that lasted more than three years but
less than four years. Accordingly, the revised accrual schedule should provide
for an unreduced intestate share percentage that is less than 18% of the
intestate estate for the qualified survivor of a cohabitation that lasted less than
three years. Thus, as with the Act, qualification as a surviving cohabitant of a
cohabitation that lasted less than three years will not automatically qualify the
applicant for a significant portion of the intestate estate. The relatively small
size of the portion of the intestate estate that might be awarded to the
surviving cohabitant of such a short-term cohabitation should minimize
litigation and the consequences of a court making an expensive “wrong”
determination on the cohabitant qualification issue. 152
The drafters of the Act acknowledged that a partner in a long-term
cohabitation arguably should enjoy greater rights arising from the
relationship than should a partner in a relatively brief cohabitation. 153
Nonetheless, the drafters expressly rejected “a system of accrued rights
whereby entitlement would progressively enlarge with the duration of the
relationship.” 154 The drafters felt that such an accrual approach would be too
complex and questioned whether the “Scottish [populace] would welcome
such a radical approach.” 155
In fact, the Act itself was a far more radical break with Scottish succession
law norms than an accrual approach would be. The drafters of the Act prized
flexibility over certainty. They believed that, given the great variation in
cohabiting relationships, a court should have broad discretion to craft an
award tailored to the facts of any given case. 156 Yet, the principal criticism
made of the Act’s intestacy provisions is that the exceptional discretion the
court possesses to set the amount of an award to the surviving cohabitant
results in an unacceptable amount of uncertainty. 157 As noted earlier, this
level of discretion and uncertainty is inconsistent with the intolerance for
discretion and uncertainty in Scottish succession law generally, which
otherwise relies upon fixed entitlements rather than judicial discretion. 158
Moreover, the SLC proposal would repeat this principal error in that the
level of discretion and uncertainty in the proposal also conflicts with the
Scottish succession law norms favoring certainty and fixed entitlements: After
considering the three exclusive factors set out in the proposal—the duration
of the cohabitation, the interdependence of the parties, and the survivor’s
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Spitko, supra note 14, at 300.
Policy Memorandum, supra note 3, ¶ 71.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 95–105 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text.
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contributions to the relationship—the court would still retain tremendous
discretion in setting the surviving cohabitant’s award. The court might award
the qualified surviving cohabitant 100% of the portion the survivor would
have taken had she been the decedent’s spouse or civil partner, or nothing at
all.
Use of a “flexible” accrual approach would enable a court to take into
account the factors that the SLC proposal focuses on in a manner that is far
more consistent with Scottish succession law norms and U.S. succession law
norms favoring certainty and fixed entitlements. As it stands, the 2002
proposal employs a “strict” accrual method that affords no discretion to the
court: The portion of the intestate estate to which a qualified surviving
cohabitant is entitled is determined solely by the accrual schedule and the
identity of competing heirs. The Scottish experience, however, should
prompt one to consider whether the 2002 proposal’s accrual approach might
be redesigned with a degree of flexibility consistent with U.S. succession law
norms.
One might introduce limited flexibility into the 2002 proposal’s accrual
approach while retaining prized certainty by giving a court discretion to
deviate within a specified range from the presumptive award set out in the
accrual schedule. Thus, the qualified surviving cohabitant’s presumptive
award would be determined solely by the duration of the cohabitation and
the identity of competing heirs. The court, however, would have limited
discretion to deviate up or down several values from that presumptive award
based upon the court’s specific findings of extraordinary facts concerning the
decedent’s intent, the surviving cohabitant’s contributions to the decedent’s
well-being, or the surviving cohabitant’s reliance interests.
3. Implications for Marriage
The Act’s drafters expressly sought to respect the special status of
marriage within Scottish society. 159 Accordingly, the statute’s cohabitation
provisions provide that the value of an award to a surviving cohabitant may
not exceed the value of what the survivor would have been entitled to had she
been a surviving spouse. 160 Moreover, when both a cohabitant and a spouse
survive the decedent, the spouse’s legal rights and prior rights in the intestate
estate take priority over any claim by the cohabitant. 161 As a result, the
cohabitant’s claim might impair the spouse’s interests only in the rare case
where the spouse’s legal rights and prior rights do not exhaust the intestate

159.
160.
161.

See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, (ASP 2) § 29(4).
Id. § 29(2), (10).
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estate and the spouse is an intestate heir—that is, where decedent left no
issue, no parents, no siblings, and no issue of siblings. 162
The SLC proposal is less respectful of the special status of marriage in
relation to cohabitant rights. The SLC has proposed revising the intestacy
scheme so that the spouse becomes a favored heir: Under the SLC proposal,
a surviving spouse would take the entire intestate estate or, in some cases,
would share the estate with the decedent’s issue. 163 Under the SLC proposal,
however, when both a spouse and a cohabitant survive the decedent, any
award to the cohabitant from the intestate estate would be taken from the
spouse’s share, although the cohabitant’s award still may not exceed what the
spouse will take in intestacy. 164
Unlike the Act and the SLC proposal, the 2002 proposal does not contain
a restriction that a surviving cohabitant may not receive more from the
decedent’s intestate estate than she would have received had she been the
decedent’s surviving spouse. Indeed, depending on the specifics of a state’s
intestacy scheme and the identity of the decedent’s other heirs, a surviving
cohabitant’s share under the 2002 proposal might well exceed the share that
a surviving spouse would have taken under the state’s intestacy statute. This
was an oversight. So as not to discourage marriage, the 2002 proposal should
be revised to add the limitation that a surviving cohabitant may not receive
more in intestacy than she would have received had she been a surviving
spouse.
Political realities in the United States may dictate that a successful reform
proposal be even more solicitous of the interests of the surviving spouse and
the institution of marriage than are the Act and the SLC proposal. It may be
argued that the Act has undermined the special status of marriage in Scottish
society by allowing a surviving cohabitant to assert a claim against the intestate
estate of a decedent who is survived by a spouse. The 2002 proposal defines a
“surviving committed partner” as “an unmarried adult” but is poorly drafted
so that a surviving unmarried cohabitant may assert a claim against the estate
of a decedent who was married at her death. 165 The 2002 proposal should be
amended to make clear that a cohabitant is foreclosed from making a claim
on the intestate estate when a spouse survives the decedent. 166 Notably, unlike
162. See Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, c.41, § 2(1)(e), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1964/41/section/2.
163. See R EPORT ON S UCCESSION, supra note 26, at 12, 16.
164. Id. at 66–67.
165. Spitko, supra note 14, app. b, at 346.
166. See Waggoner, supra note 2, at 236 (proposing a draft Uniform De Facto Marriage Act, “[t]he
starting point [of which] is that the couple must not be married to anyone else” (footnote omitted)).
The Uniform Law Commission, on the joint recommendation of the Joint Editorial Board for
Uniform Trust and Estate Acts and the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Family Law, has
appointed a Study Committee to consider “the need for and feasibility of drafting a uniform act
or model law addressing the economic rights of unmarried cohabitants in the United States, both
at divorce and upon death.” See Economic Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants, UNIFORM LAW COMM’N,
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Scotland, many of the other foreign jurisdictions that grant intestate
inheritance rights to a surviving committed partner preclude qualification as
a cohabitant if one or both of the partners was married to another. 167
IV. CONCLUSION
The Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006’s lack of clarity as to its underlying
policies has given rise to significant interpretation difficulties. Moreover, the
statute’s grant to courts of exceptionally broad and unguided discretion in
awarding a portion of the intestate estate to a surviving cohabitant has
undermined predictability and private ordering. Most importantly, this broad
discretion is at odds with Scottish succession law norms valuing certainty and
preferring fixed entitlements and limited judicial discretion. Finally, although
the Act maintains a clear distinction between the rights of married people and
the rights of unmarried cohabitants, the statute has somewhat undermined
the special status of marriage in Scottish society by allowing a cohabitant to
assert a claim against the intestate estate of a decedent who is survived by a
spouse. Moreover, the Scottish Law Commission’s reform proposal is even less
respectful of the institution of marriage and the interests of a surviving spouse.
The Scottish experience with respect to the provision of intestate
inheritance rights for unmarried cohabitants should inform U.S. intestacy law
reform efforts concerning unmarried committed partners. Any U.S. reform
proposal should specify the purposes and values that ground its provision of
intestate inheritance rights to a surviving cohabitant. Moreover, the discretion
the proposal affords to courts should be reflective of the limited tolerance for
uncertainty found in U.S. succession law. Finally, the proposal should be
respectful of the interests of a surviving spouse and the special status of
marriage in the United States.
In light of the lessons learned from the Scottish experience, this Article
asserts that the author’s 2002 proposal for an accrual/multi-factor approach
to intestate inheritance rights for unmarried committed partners should be
modified. To increase certainty, the revised proposal should clarify how courts
are to operationalize the proposal’s purposes. To add flexibility, the revised
proposal should forego a minimum cohabitation prerequisite and should
authorize courts in extraordinary cases to deviate within a specified range
from the strict accrual schedule. And finally, to safeguard the special status of
marriage and to protect the interests of a surviving spouse, the revised
proposal should provide that a surviving cohabitant may not take more in
intestacy than she would have taken had she been the decedent’s surviving
spouse and that no claim by a surviving cohabitant may be brought when the
decedent is survived by a spouse.

http://www.uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx?title=Economic%20Rights%20of%20Unmarried%20
Cohabitants (last visited Apr. 3, 2018). The Study Committee has yet to report. See id.
167. See Reid et al., supra note 146, at 507.

